3 January 2013

Discouraging Foreign Investment: The Security Clearance Factor

Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is vital for the health of any economy. For Pakistan’s developing economy, considered by foreign investors as a high risk one, FDI is critical due to its relatively lower domestic investment and resources and a higher reliance on foreign investment to spur domestic productivity and growth. Annual FDI inflows into Pakistan in the last 10 years have reduced from a peak of USD $5.4 billion in 2007-2008 to USD $1.4 billion in 2011-2012. Total FDI inflows into Pakistan in the preceding 10 years have been only USD $25.66 billion.

There are four primary reasons for the steady decline of FDI into Pakistan: (i) the energy shortfall; (ii) the poor security situation; (iii) uncertain and inconsistent government policies; and (iv) the global recession. Therefore, any foreign investor who decides to invest in Pakistan in spite of these adverse and trying conditions should be given the red carpet treatment, saluted and awarded a medal, and their foreign investment into Pakistan should be fast-tracked.

As if the energy shortfall and poor security situation were not enough to dissuade foreign investors from investing in Pakistan, the government is embarking on misconceived and ill-advised policies that are further discouraging, if not scaring away, those few foreign companies that are still interesting in investing in Pakistan, despite the odds. Instead of being welcomed with a red-carpet, foreign investors are being met with red-tape and suspicion.

In July 2011, Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) issued a directive, U.O. No. 5/37/2011-S-II dated 19 July 2011, which stipulates that all foreign investors must undergo security clearance prior to any of the following:
(i) Incorporation of a company in Pakistan with foreign shareholders/directors;

(ii) Issuance or transfer of shares to new foreign shareholders in a company incorporated in Pakistan;

(iii) Election/re-election of foreign directors or appointment of a foreign chief executive in a company incorporated in Pakistan; and

(iv) Registration of a foreign company’s branch office in Pakistan.
All the above actions are necessary preludes to FDI. Therefore, if foreign investors are unable to get past the above, FDI will either be delayed or lost permanently.

Prior to this directive, the requirement of obtaining security clearance was restricted to only three types of entities: (i) security service companies; (ii) companies with Indian nationals as shareholders or directors and (iii) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) having foreign funding or involving foreigners.

A major problem is that security clearance is conducted by eight different agencies, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Intelligence Bureau (IB). From the perspective of a foreign investor, it is uncomfortable, if not daunting, to be investigated by intelligence agencies. This is not the right way to welcome foreign investors into Pakistan. It is counterproductive and may scare away foreign investors. One does not invest in a foreign country to be investigated.

The events that led to the issuance of this MOI security clearance directive are seemingly the Raymond Davis incident in January 2011 and the Abbottabad incident in May 2011 and the resulting revelation that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was allegedly using private enterprises, including front companies, as a cover for covert and clandestine operations in Pakistan. It is a classic example of getting the diagnosis right but the prognosis wrong. No patriotic person wishes to see foreign spies and Blackwater types roaming freely in their country and committing espionage and terrorism. However, there are ways to deal with such problems and there are ways not to deal with such problems. If you want to kill weed in a lawn, you use a weed-killer that kills only the weed and not poison that kills everything, including healthy grass. If you want to kill a fly, you use a flyswatter, not a sledgehammer.

The MOI directive was issued to the Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), which is the regulator of the corporate sector in Pakistan. The SECP began immediate implementation of the same without questioning its legality. The SECP has overlooked the fact that the MOI directive has no legal basis because the same has been issued by the MOI and does not arise from any statutory instrument and the MOI does not have statutory jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the corporate sector in Pakistan that fall under ambit of the SECP. For example, companies in Pakistan are incorporated and function under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and the rules and regulations made thereunder. By issuing the security clearance directive, the MOI has practically amended the procedure under which companies are incorporated and function, which is illegal and without lawful authority. By doing so, the MOI has encroached on the SECP’s domain because, under the law, it is the SECP, not the MOI, which determines who may or may not incorporate a company in Pakistan and how directors are to be elected or re-elected.

I have had the opportunity of being engaged by the World Bank/International Finance Commission as a consultant on numerous occasions for the Pakistan part of their Doing Business and Investing Across Borders reports, which respectively provide indicators of the cost of doing business by identifying specific regulations that enhance or constrain business investment, productivity, and growth and provide objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement and benchmark the ease of establishing and operating foreign-owned companies in countries across the world by evaluating their investment policy framework and its implementation in practice. In both reports, Pakistan was ranked above India and other regional countries when it came to ease with which a foreign investor could set up a business. That is, until the MOI security clearance directive.

Subjecting foreign investors to security clearance would have been somewhat tolerable if government machinery was competent, efficient and sincere enough to process security clearance cases expeditiously and transparently. Unfortunately, this is not the case and processing of security clearance cases have been delayed due to bureaucratic red tape and even, as some quarters have alleged, graft.

The result of the MOI security clearance directive, apart from pushing Pakistan down acclaimed business and investment rankings, has wreaked havoc on FDI in Pakistan, especially with regard to foreign investment in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which constitute the bulk of the approximately 63,000 companies in Pakistan (as of December 2012). The immediate impact, hitherto only known to the foreign investors themselves and their lawyers and chartered accountants engaged by them in Pakistan at the pre-investment stage, has been devastating. Prior to the MOI security clearance directive, the incorporation of a private limited company with foreign shareholding used to take, on average, seven days (the fastest incorporation experienced by me in over 12 years of law practice was only two days (from the date of filing) by the SECP’s Company Registration Office in Lahore). Now, after the security clearance directive, it is taking at least three months to incorporate a company with foreign shareholding, while the average period is closer to six months. Indeed, there are security clearance cases that have been pending for over almost a year with the MOI. Not so long ago, company set-up procedures in Pakistan used to be the fastest not only in South Asia, but also compared to the Middle East and Central Asia. Pakistan has now slipped to the bottom of the investment indicators vis-à-vis company incorporation. Since local company incorporation is a prerequisite to most business activity involving foreign investment in Pakistan, the adverse impact of this security clearance requirement has rippled across all investment sectors.

The government should, in Pakistan’s economic interests, either (a) recall the MOI security clearance directive or (b) allow provisional approvals to all matters involving foreign investors pending their security clearance so that, in the interim, foreign investors can get on with the business of investing in Pakistan. Such provisional approvals should be allowed to continue indefinitely until such time that the security clearance process is completed. If it transpires that the MOI has no objection to a particular foreign investor, then final approval may be given. If, on the other hand, a foreign investor, for some reason, is considered a security risk on the basis of some intelligence finding, then the provisional approval may be cancelled. This way, the majority of foreign investors, who are legitimate and do not pose any security risk, would not suffer needless delays while awaiting the outcome of their security clearances. Such a measure would also restore Pakistan’s investment reputation and investment-friendly rankings, at least to levels that existed prior the issuance of the MOI security clearance directive.

The decline in FDI arising from the security clearance requirement for foreign investors is a needless, self-inflicted wound that is harming Pakistan’s developing economy and one which it can ill afford.

This article was published in the 'Business Recorder' newspaper on 2 January 2013 under the title "Discouraging FDI".

4 October 2012

The Illegality of US Drone Attacks in Pakistan

Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam

Since June 2004, the United States has carried out 337 drone attacks in Pakistan, which have resulted in the deaths of approximately 3,337 people and injuries to approximately 1,500. According to a recent study jointly carried out by Stanford University and New York University titled "Living Under Drones", only 2% of the victims of US drone attacks are high-ranking militants and only 1 in 50 (or 0.5%) of those killed are alleged terrorists. This means that the overwhelming majority of those killed by US drones in Pakistan are innocent civilians.

The summary, indiscriminate and ruthless nature of the US drone programme can be guaged by the fact that it assumes, as a matter of official policy, that all military-age men (i.e. aged 18 to 40 years) killed in a drone strike zone are deemed combatants “unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.” Notwithstanding the outrageous premise upon which this assumption is based, it begs the following questions: (a) how does the US determine the age (or even gender) of those within a potential drone strike zone? and (b) what is the logic and purpose in determining the innocence of victims posthumously? In other words, the US considers drone victims guilty until proven innocent posthumously.

The increasing intensity of drone strikes in Pakistan can be guaged by the fact that under the Bush administration, there was a drone strike in Pakistan every 43 days whereas during the first two years of the Obama administration, there was a drone strike every four days.

US drone attacks in Pakistan are a violation of:
(i) the basic human right to life;
(ii) the principle of due process of law;
(iii) Pakistan's state sovereignty
(iv) international law; and
(v) the municipal or state laws of Pakistan and the United States.
Below is a list of the national and international laws that are breached each time the US kills people through drone strikes in Pakistan:

1. Charter of the United Nations, 1945

Article 33 of the United Nations Charter states: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

US drone strikes are, therefore, in blatant violation of Article 33 of the UN Charter as the US is ignoring the mandatory mechanisms prescribed by the UN for the pacific settlement of disputes.

The right of self-defence conferred by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is a narrow exception to the Charter’s general prohibition of the use of force to settle international disputes. Furthermore, under the 19th century formulation of customary international law known as the Caroline test, countries may engage in individual or collective pre-emptive self-defense when the necessity for preemptive self–defence is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation" (i.e. instant and ovewhelming necessity). The use of drones by the US to kill people in remote mountainous areas of Pakistan over 12,000 km from the US mainland fails to meet the criteria laid down by this test.

Notwithstanding Article 51, the predecessor of the International Court of Justice, namely the Permanent Court of International Justice, established a rule of customary international law in the Lotus Case (Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey) of 1927 that "the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State."

2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

The US drone attacks are a violation of the following Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
(i) Article 3: Right to life
(ii) Article 5: Protection against cruel and inhuman punishment
(iii) Article 7: Equal protection of law
(iv) Article 10: Right to fair and public hearing
(v) Article 11: Presumption of innocence
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948

Drones are a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which prohibits killing members of a group and infliction of pain and suffering to the members of a group.

All US drone attacks are carried out in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, specifically in a few tribal agencies in which the overwhelming majority of the population are ethnic Pakhtuns. Therefore, the US drones are specifically targetting Pakhtun tribes, which are a "group" under the 1948 Convention and the killing of a group is considered genocide under the 1948 Convention.

4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” The ICCPR further guarantees an accused person the right to a presumption of innocence and a fair trial.

The US drone attacks are in breach of the following Articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

(i) Article 6: Pertains to right to life and further provides that the death penalty may only be allowed in very limited circumstances, but in no circumstances allowed to be imposed on persons below eighteen years of age or carried out on pregnant women.

(ii) Article 14: Pertains to procedural justice and provides that every person has the right to be treated under the due process of law, which includes, without limitation, the presumption of innocence; the right to a hearing; the right to be informed of the charges leveled against him and the right to appeal.

5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998

Although the US is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, US drone attacks fall under the definition of "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" as defined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 respectively.

6. International Conventions

US drone attacks in Pakistan violate established principles of international law.

Drone attacks violate the international law principles of proportionality and distinction. Proportionality means that an attack cannot be excessive in relation to the threat. Distinction requires that the attack be directed only at legitimate military targets. The US drone attacks fail on both these counts.

Drone attacks are targeted assassinations. According to Philip Alston, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, a targeted killing is the "intentional, premeditated, and deliberate use of lethal force...against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator." Targeted assassinations are extra-judicial executions and are considered grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

Christof Heyns, the current UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, has expressed grave concern about drone strikes, observing that they may constitute war crimes. He has questioned the US policy of killing rather than capturing individuals and has also questioned whether the State in which the killing takes place has given its consent. Heyns has also asked the US Government what safeguards it puts in place, if any, to ensure that drone strikes comply with international law. He has also asked the US what measures it takes after any such killing to ensure that its legal and factual analysis was accurate and, if not, the remedial measures it would take, including justice and compensation for victims and their families. To date, the Special Rapporteur has not received any satisfactory response from the US Government.

7. United States Constitution, 1789

There is no legal basis under the US Constitution that allows the US Government to declare war on or summarily order the execution of individuals that it considers a threat. The US Government, like any other government, has legal means available to in under its own national law as well as under international law to seek the indictment and extradition of persons that are wanted for crimes on US soil.

The Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution give the accused the right to a speedy and public trial and forbid the state from abridging or depriving a person of life without due process of law. The US drone attacks deny their victims each of these rights.

8. United States War Crimes Act, 1996

Drone attacks are grave breaches of Geneva Conventions and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention are punishable as war crimes under the US War Crimes Act of 1996. The US War Crimes Act applies specicially to war crimes committed by members of the US Armed Forces and US nationals. A war crime resulting in the death of a person is a crime punishabe under the US War Crimes Act with death.

9. United States Federal Executive Orders (1976, 1978 and 1981)

The US drone attacks are in breach of three US Federal Executive Orders that are still in force:

In 1976, US President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905, Section 5(g) of which reads: “No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.”

In 1978, US President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12036, further strengthening and expanding Ford's Executive Order 11905 by stating: ""No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." This expanded the prohibition on political assassination to any type of assassination.

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12333, Section 2.11 of which states: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” Section 2.12 further reads: “Indirect participation. No agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order.”

Therefore, the entire drone programme of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is in breach of the above US Federal Executive Orders.

10. Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (2001) and the National Defense Authorization Act, 2012

The US Government justifies its drone policy with reference to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which the US Congress passed in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The AUMF authorized the use of force against groups and countries that supported the 9/11 attacks. However, Congress disallowed the Bush Administration’s request for carte blanche military authorization “to deter and preempt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.” The US drones are being employed as an instrument of deterrence and preemption against suspected militants, including civilians who happen to be in the target area, which is beyond the scope of authority granted by the AUMF. Furthermore, the US drone policy is being continued notwithstanding the National Defense Authorization Act, 2012 in which Congress specifically clarified that "Nothing in this section is intended to...expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force."

11. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973

The US drone attacks are in blatant violation of Articles 4, 9 and 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, which provide that the life of all persons shall be protected and all persons shall be entitled to equal protection of the law, fair trial and due process:

Article 4: Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law, etc. (1) To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan. (2) In particular:- (a) no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law...

Article 9: Security of person. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law.

Article 10A: Right to fair trial. For the determination of his civil rights and obligations or in any criminal charge against him a person shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process.
12. Pakistan Penal Code, 1860

Any criminal activity that takes place on the soil of Pakistan, whether it originates from within Pakistan or without, attracts the applicable penal provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code.

The US drone attacks violate the applicable provisions of Chapter XVI (Offences Affecting the Human Body) and Chapter XVII (Offences Against Property) of the Pakistan Penal Code, which make it a criminal offence to cause injury or death to persons residing in Pakistan and to damage or destroy property in Pakistan without the property owner's permission.

13. Pakistan's Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

The US drone attacks are in breach of Pakistan's Criminal Procedure Code ("CrPC"), which lays down detailed mechanisms and procedures (i.e. due process) to be followed prior to punishing any person accused of a criminal offence. Therefore, the entire scheme of the CrPC is violated by US drone strikes.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above that all those killed by US drones in Pakistan are killed extra-judicially and, therefore, illegally under Pakistani, US and international laws. Even if we assume that the tiny minority of those killed by US drones are indeed terrorists, they still have the right to a fair trial and due process of law, rather than summary execution without any trial, let alone a fair one. The killing of persons by US drones in Pakistan is nothing less than murder and those doing the killing should be treated as nothing less than those guilty of murder.

Postscript: On 18 November 2012, US President Barack Obama, speaking in the context of the Israeli-Gaza conflict, stated: "...there's no country on Earth that would tolerate missiles raining down on its citizens from outside its borders." This begs the question: why should Pakistan tolerate US missiles raining down on its citizens fired from US drones that fly into Pakistan from outside its borders in Afghanistan?

4 February 2011

Diplomatic Immunity and the Raymond Davis Case

Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam

The shooting to death of two Pakistani youths, namely Faizan Haider and Muhammad Faheem, by a U.S. Consulate official, Raymond Allen Davis, and the death of a third Pakistani, namely Obaid-ur-Rahman, by a vehicle operated by the U.S. Consulate, in Lahore on 27 January 2011 has, once again, raised concerns relating to the conduct of American officials working for the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Pakistan.

Raymond Davis was arrested by the Punjab Police on the same day and, on 28 January 2011, was presented before a magistrate in Lahore, who remanded him into police custody for six days. On 29 January 2011, three days after the incident, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, without even naming Raymond Davis, called for his release whilst claiming that he was a diplomat and was being detained illegally in violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 (the “Vienna Diplomatic Convention”). On 1 February 2011, the Lahore High Court, in response to a public interest petition, restrained Pakistani authorities from handing Raymond Davis over to the U.S. authorities and has ordered his name to be placed on the Exit Control List to prevent him from leaving Pakistan.

It may be pertinent to note that the U.S. Embassy’s press release of 29 January 2011 makes the following, rather surprising, claim:

“On January 27, the diplomat acted in self-defense when confronted by two armed men on motorcycles. The diplomat had every reason to believe that the armed men meant him bodily harm. Minutes earlier, the two men, who had criminal backgrounds, had robbed money and valuables at gunpoint from a Pakistani citizen in the same area.”
One wonders the basis on which the U.S. Embassy is claiming that two of the deceased had criminal backgrounds or had committed any crime. The deceased have not been found guilty of the offence alleged by the U.S. Embassy, either by the investigating police authorities or by any court of law. In making such an unwarranted claim, which is against diplomatic norms and also amounts to unlawful interference in a legal process of a host state in violation of Article 41(1) of the Vienna Diplomatic Convention, the U.S. Embassy has clearly overstepped its bounds.

The press release goes on to say:

“When detained, the U.S. diplomat identified himself to police as a diplomat and repeatedly requested immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Local police and senior authorities failed to observe their legal obligation to verify his status with either the U.S. Consulate General in Lahore or the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. Furthermore, the diplomat was formally arrested and remanded into custody, which is a violation of international norms and the Vienna [Diplomatic] Convention, to which Pakistan is a signatory.”
It seems that the U.S. Embassy is unaware that when a foreigner is arrested and claims diplomatic immunity, it is not the legal responsibility of the arresting authority, in this case, the Punjab Police, to ascertain his diplomatic status; it is the responsibility of the arrested person and his embassy or consulate to establish his diplomatic credentials and the same cannot achieved by orally boasting of diplomatic immunity without any documentary proof. In any case, Raymond Davis did not claim diplomatic immunity at the time of his arrest. The Vienna Diplomatic Convention does not require states to assume that every foreigner is a diplomat. It is the responsibility of all diplomats to claim and establish diplomatic immunity and carry on their persons, at all times, their diplomatic identity cards, which are issued by the Foreign Ministry of the host state and to produce the same on demand when required by any government authority, including law enforcement agencies such as the police. The U.S. Embassy has overlooked the fact that Mr. Raymond Davis was arrested from a non-diplomatic vehicle (with non-diplomatic registration plates) and he failed to produce any diplomatic identity card to establish his diplomatic credentials.

Also, the mere holding of a diplomatic passport does not confer diplomatic status on someone. Diplomatic status must be expressly recognized by the host state. For example, a foreign diplomat in India will not be a diplomat in Pakistan. He may visit Pakistan using a diplomatic passport, however, he will have no diplomatic immunity in Pakistan by virtue of his diplomatic passport because he is not a member of any diplomatic mission in Pakistan and has not been recognized as such by Pakistan. Recognition of diplomatic status is expressed through the issuance of a diplomatic identity card to a person by the host state, which, in the case of Raymond Davis, seems to be absent.

Earlier, the U.S. Embassy issued the following press release on 28 January 2011, a day after the arrest and detention of Raymond Davis:

“A staff member of the U.S. Consulate General in Lahore was involved in an incident yesterday that regrettably resulted in the loss of life. The U.S. Embassy is working with Pakistani authorities to determine the facts and work toward a resolution.”
Clearly, there is an inconsistency in the U.S. Embassy’s presses releases of 28 January and 29 January. The U.S. Embassy did not raise the issue of diplomatic immunity a day after the arrest and, in fact, referred to Raymond Davis as being a “staff member of the U.S. Consulate, General in Lahore”. In other words: a consular officer. The U.S. Embassy’s press release of 28 January only reinforced the belief of the Punjab Police and the Punjab Government, and justifiably so, that Mr. Raymond Davis was not a diplomat but a “consular officer” and, as such, not immune from detention and prosecution.

Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 (the “Vienna Consular Convention”), consular officers do not enjoy unfettered diplomatic immunity. Article 41 of the Vienna Consular Convention states:

“Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority.”
It is evident that shooting to death of two human beings constitutes “a grave crime” pursuant to the Vienna Consular Convention and Raymond David’s detention is pursuant to a judicial process, having been authorized by a competent judicial authority as per the Vienna Consular Convention.

What needs to be appreciated by the U.S. Embassy is that if a Pakistani national, shoots dead two Americans on the streets of New York using an unlicensed weapon whilst driving a non-diplomatic vehicle and is, subsequently, arrested by the New York police and claims diplomatic immunity without producing any diplomatic ID, will the New York police be bound to release him or keep him detention till such time that he or the Pakistani Consulate in New York establishes his diplomatic credentials? Clearly, the New York police will have the right to detain him till such time.

Therefore, in light of the aforesaid, the arrest of Raymond Davis by the Punjab Police was legal and not in violation of the Vienna Consular Convention or, for that matter, the Vienna Diplomatic Convention (both ratified by Pakistan in its Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972). Furthermore, the continued detention of Raymond Davis is not a violation of the Vienna Diplomatic Convention till such time that it is proved that he is a diplomat.

The U.S. Embassy, until now, has failed to establish the diplomatic status of Raymond Davis. Indeed, the evidence so far is to the contrary. A local news channel has shown a letter written by the U.S. Embassy dated 20 January 2010 wherein it is informing Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry that Raymond Davis is a member of the Embassy’s “administrative and technical staff” and requesting for him the issuance of a “non-diplomatic ID” card. This letter clearly shows that the U.S. Embassy itself did not recognize Raymond Davis as a diplomat. It, therefore, seems that the U.S. Embassy’s 29 January 2011 press statement claiming that Raymond Davis is a diplomat is an afterthought intended to shield him from criminal prosecution.

No one should dispute the fact that diplomats are immune from criminal prosecution under the Vienna Diplomatic Convention (Article 31(1)). Even if we were to hypothetically assume, without admitting, that Raymond Davis is a diplomat, there are still options that can be exercised. The Vienna Diplomatic Convention clearly reveals its spirit when it states, in its preamble, that “the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.” The Vienna Diplomatic Convention allows foreign states to (i) punish their own diplomats for committing crimes in host countries (Article 31(4)) or (ii) waive the diplomatic immunity of its diplomats so that they can be prosecuted by the host state (Article 32). Therefore, the host state may itself request the foreign state to waive the immunity of a diplomat so that it can prosecute such diplomat.

The Vienna Diplomatic Convention also contains a mechanism under which a diplomat can be stripped of his diplomatic status and immunity by the host state. The host state has the authority under Article 9 of the Vienna Diplomatic Convention to declare a diplomat as a persona non grata and, thereafter, under Article 43(b), to issue a notice to the foreign state’s embassy informing it that it refuses to recognize such person as a member of the foreign country’s diplomatic mission. Upon receipt of the notice under Article 43(b) by the foreign state’s embassy, the diplomat in question forthwith ceases to remain a diplomat and is automatically stripped of his diplomatic immunity. Therefore, even if it is established that Raymond Davis is a diplomat, the Government of Pakistan can strip him of his diplomatic status and immunity by, firstly, declaring him a persona non grata under Article 9 of the Vienna Diplomatic Convention and, thereafter, by issuing a notice under Article 43(b) of the Vienna Diplomatic Convention to the U.S. Embassy, Islamabad informing it therein that Pakistan refuses to recognize Raymond Davis as a member of the U.S. diplomatic mission.

Even if Pakistan does not take the above action, the U.S. can take the moral high ground and itself waive diplomatic immunity for Raymond Davis. There are precedents in this regard and one need not look beyond the manner in which the United States itself views diplomatic immunity. Though, in the case of Raymond Davis, who is a junior functionary, the U.S. Embassy is claiming diplomatic immunity for a person who shot dead two Pakistani youth using an unlicensed weapon, the U.S. itself demanded the lifting of immunity of a senior diplomat who accidently killed a U.S. citizen in a car accident on its soil.

In 1997, Gueorgui Makharadze, the Georgian Deputy Ambassador to the United States, accidently killed an American teenager in a road accident in Washington, D.C. The U.S. exerted extreme pressure on the Georgian government to lift his diplomatic immunity even though it was not a deliberate shoot-to-death killing, as in the case of Raymond Davis, but a car accident. The Georgian government finally relented “in the interests of U.S.-Georgian relations and on moral and ethical grounds.” Makharadze was tried in a U.S. court, found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 21 years in prison. While lifting Makharadze’s diplomatic immunity, then Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze observed, “I cannot imagine diplomacy and politics devoid of moral principle.”

Even if Raymond Davis is a diplomat, wouldn’t it be prudent for the U.S. to follow little Georgia’s example and lift his diplomatic immunity in the interests of U.S.-Pakistan relations and on moral and ethical grounds. Or, perhaps, unlike Georgia, the United States of America sees diplomacy as being devoid of moral principles.

This article was published in 'The Nation' newspaper on 4 February 2011

23 March 2010

One System, Not Four: Why the Concurrent Legislative List should not be abolished in the National Interest

Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam & Sehrish Tasneem Zafar

I. Introduction

Pakistan is at a critical juncture of its history when it direly needs stern action from its political leadership and elected representatives that further unites, rather than divides, the nation. The 27-member Special Committee of Parliament on Constitutional Reforms (the “Constitutional Reforms Committee”) chaired by Senator Mian Raza Rabbani, has formulated recommendations for constitutional reform, one of which is the abolishment of the Concurrent Legislative List in the Fourth Schedule under Article 70(4) read with Chapter 1 of Part V (the “Concurrent List”) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the “Constitution”). The abolishment of the Concurrent List will have adverse and far-reaching consequences not only for national unity but also for national integrity.

Constitutional reform is a very serious matter that should not be undertaken lightly for political expediency and for gaining short-term electoral-oriented popularity at the expense of long-term national interests. Furthermore, all constitutional reforms are not of the same importance, weight and consequence and, therefore, should not be clubbed together under the same agenda and delivery deadline. Minor constitutional reforms i.e. those reforms that do not alter the spirit and structure of the Constitution should be detached from major constitutional reforms that do, especially those reforms that would pose a potential threat to the Federation of Pakistan.

As an example, renaming of the North-West Frontier Province would not be a reform that would alter the spirit or structure of the Constitution, nor would it have any adverse consequences for Pakistan. However, abolishment of the Concurrent List impacts and alters the spirit and structure of the Constitution in a manner that will have adverse consequences for Pakistan, some of which, perhaps, are not being foreseen by the Constitutional Reforms Committee.

It is not without reason that some of Pakistan’s most respected constitutional experts, such as S.M. Zafar and Khalid Anwer, have publicly opposed the abolishment of the Concurrent List. Indeed, Senator S.M. Zafar, who is himself a member of the Constitutional Reforms Committee, has rightly written a dissenting note on the Constitutional Reform Committee’s recommendation for the abolishment of the Concurrent List. Mr. Khalid Anwer, in a recent article in a leading national daily newspaper, while laying out cogent reasons for retaining the Concurrent List and exposing some of the questionable factors behind the proposal for its abolishment, pleaded for “one system, not four.”

II. Distribution of Legislative Powers in Federal Systems

To appreciate the importance of the Concurrent List and understand why it should not be abolished, let us first understand what concurrent legislative powers do within the context of the Pakistani federation and federalism generally.

The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan envisaged and established a parliamentary democracy with a federal system of government. Indeed, Pakistan is one of only 29 countries of the world today that have a federal system of government. The Constitution establishes a federation in which legislative powers have been distributed between the federation and its four major federating units, namely the provinces of (i) Balochistan, (ii) the North-West Frontier, (iii) the Punjab and (iv) Sindh.

Federalism has proved to be a successful organizing model for countries that seek to maintain elements of both unity and diversity in their populaces and political institutions. The essence of federalism lies in the sharing of executive and legislative powers by the federation and its federating units, i.e. the provinces or states.

This distribution of legislative powers, also known as the ‘division of legislative powers’, is one of the most significant and fundamental aspects of any federal constitution. In a federal system, legislative or law-making powers are distributed amongst the federal legislature and the legislatures of the federating units. The distribution of legislative powers between the federation and the provinces is designed to blend the desire for autonomy and diversity with the imperatives of national unity, common interest and cohesion. The aim is to emphasize cooperation and coordination, rather than division and competition, between the federation and the provinces, with the objective of creating and maintaining interdependence whilst orchestrating a balance between the autonomy of the provinces and the unity and synergy of the federation.

There appear to be four general trends in the distribution of legislative powers around the world: (i) One common practice is to confer a list of exclusive powers on the federal government, leaving residual powers to the federating units; (ii) A second approach involves identifying a list of subjects pertaining to the federal and federating units respectively, with an added clause allocating residual powers to the federal government (as in Canada and Belgium); (iii) A third practice is to draw up three lists: federal, provincial and concurrent with residual powers given to the federation (as in India and Malaysia); (iv) The fourth and most common trend is to draw up two lists only - federal and concurrent – with all residual powers left to the federating units (as in Pakistan, the United States, Switzerland, Australia, Germany and Austria).

The residual power confers legal authority on one of the two tiers of government – either the federal or the provincial – for all matters that do not appear among the items listed in the legislative lists under the constitution. The purpose of residual power is twofold: (i) to provide for executive and legislative authority either to the federal or provincial government in cases where such powers are not explicitly listed in the constitution; and (ii) to account for unforeseen matters, which arise over time as a country develops economically and socially.

Although each of the two legislative tiers usually has its own sphere of jurisdiction, nothing prevents the two legislative tiers from mutually exercising a given power. This is known as shared or “concurrent” jurisdiction. In fact, 25 out of the 29 federal systems that exist in the world today make provisions for concurrent jurisdiction in legislative affairs, i.e. have concurrent lists (see attached Schedule). This is neither a coincidence nor without reason: cooperation and interdependence between tiers of government – federal and provincial – in specific areas are essential for development in any form of federal governance.

In all cases of concurrent or shared jurisdiction, federal constitutions contain a paramountcy provision that determines which legislative tier will prevail in cases of conflicting legislation. This tier is then said to possess potential, though not actual, exclusive jurisdiction since it could possibly occupy the whole field.

The general principle underlying the distribution of legislative powers in federal systems is that matters of common interest and concern to the country as a whole ought to be assigned to the federal legislature and matters of a decidedly regional or local character should be assigned to the provincial or state legislatures. The general pattern which emerges from this principle is that matters such as defence, foreign affairs, citizenship, currency, communications, civil aviation, major ports, administration of justice, national territorial waters, inter-provincial trade, natural resources, energy, etc. typically fall within the jurisdiction of the federation, while more regionally or locally-oriented matters such as social services, local government, provincial roads, agriculture, culture and tourism, etc. fall within the purview of provinces. Where strong national and regional interests coincide, as in taxation, education, health, maintenance of law and order, etc., powers are made concurrent, i.e. vesting in both the federation as well as the federating units.

III. Genesis of the Concurrent List

At this juncture, it would be pertinent to mention, that the entire scheme of distribution of legislative powers under the Constitution originates from the pre-independence Government of India Act, 1935 (the “1935 Act”), which was passed by the British Parliament and adopted as Pakistan’s Interim Constitution by Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly. Insofar as the Concurrent List is concerned, it is desirable to quote what the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (the “Joint Select Committee”) had to say with reference to the Concurrent List, as contemplated in its 1934 Report, which led to the 1935 Act:

“Experience has shown, both in India and elsewhere, that there are certain matters which cannot be allocated exclusively either to a central or to a Provincial legislature and for which, though it is often desirable that provincial legislation should make provision, it is equally necessary that the central legislature should also have a legislative jurisdiction to enable it, in some cases to secure uniformity in the main principles of law throughout the country, in others, to guide and encourage provincial effort and in others, again, to provide remedies for mischief arising in the provincial sphere, but extending, or liable to extend beyond the boundaries of a single province.”
The above enunciation by the Joint Select Committee was not intended to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, it would be convenient to highlight the three main objectives of concurrent legislative power envisaged by the Joint Select Committee. These were: (i) securing uniformity; (ii) guiding and encouraging provincial effort; and (iii) providing remedies for problems arising in the provincial sphere, but extending, or liable to extend beyond the boundaries of a single province.

Under the 1935 Act, which the governed Pakistan as its Interim Constitution until its first indigenous Constitution in 1956, the Federal List had 59 subjects; the Provincial List had 54 subjects; and the Concurrent List had 36 subjects. Under the 1956 Constitution, the Federal List had 30 subjects; the Provincial List had 94 subjects; and the Concurrent List had 19 subjects. Under the 1962 Constitution, which created a unitary system, there was only a Federal List with 49 subjects. Finally, the 1973 Constitution, after much thought and deliberation, established only two lists: the Federal List with 67 subjects; and the Concurrent List with 47 subjects.

IV. Salient Features of Distribution of Legislative Power in Pakistan

The following salient features mark the scheme of distribution of legislative powers under the Constitution:

(i) Article 142 demarcates the legislative domain, subject to the controlling principle of the supremacy of the Federation, which is the basis of the entire system. There is a four-fold distribution of legislative power represented by two legislative lists:

(a) to the Federation under the Federal List;

(b) to both the Federation and Provinces under the Concurrent List;

(c) to the Provinces with respect to any matter not enumerated in either the Federal or Concurrent List (i.e. residual power); and

(d) to the Federation in case of a territory not forming part of any Province.

(ii) Supremacy of the Federation is maintained in one situation: if both the Federation and a province legislate on the same subject-matter under the Concurrent List and both laws are in conflict with or inconsistent with each other, then the rule of repugnancy, as enshrined in Article 143, comes into play to uphold the principle of the supremacy of federal law. Specifically, a provincial law cannot override a federal law and must yield before the federal law in the event of conflict or inconsistency.

(iii) Parliament, by virtue of Article 142(a), has exclusive power to legislate on any matter under the Federal List.

(iv) Both the Federal and Provincial legislatures, by virtue of Article 142(b), have the power to legislate in respect of any subject contained in the Concurrent List.

(v) In determining the extent of legislative power of the federation and the units, if a doubt arises as to the list in which a particular subject of legislation falls, the non obstante clause in Article 142 achieves provincial supremacy.

(vi) If a particular topic does not find an express mention in the two legislative lists, then the exclusive power to legislate thereon (i.e., the residuary law-making power) is vested in the Provinces (note that in India, the opposite is the case, the residuary power vests in the Federation).

Thus, the principles governing the distribution of powers under the Constitution may be summarized as follows:

(a) A provincial legislature cannot legislate on any matter falling under the Federal List.

(b) The Federal and Provincial legislatures may both legislate on matters on the Concurrent List. However, where a subject-matter has been concurrently legislated and if there is a conflict or inconsistency between the Federal and Provincial law, the Federal law will prevail.

(c) A subject-matter not falling under either the Federal or Concurrent List becomes the exclusive domain of the Provincial legislatures and the Federal legislature cannot legislate upon it.

By way of comparison, it may be pertinent to mention that in South Africa, the legislative powers of South African provinces are not unfettered despite the existence of an exclusive provincial list. Under Article 44(2) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, the federal Parliament may intervene, by passing legislation with regard to any matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a province when it is necessary to: (i) maintain national security; (ii) maintain economic unity; (iii) maintain essential national standards; (iv) establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or (v) prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of another province or to the country as a whole.

In this broad-ranging overview, it is clearly evident that there is no single uniform approach to the distribution of government and legislative powers and functions in federal systems. Indeed, one may be overwhelmed by the variety of arrangements that have been employed to enumerate and allocate areas of jurisdictional authority between the two tiers of government in federations. Notwithstanding the diversity of these approaches, however, it is also important to recognize that the devices, instruments and allocations, which have proven to be effective in one federal system, have often been successfully adapted or modified to suit other federations. Such comparative perspectives, therefore, can be instructive for Pakistan at this time when it is engaged in the process of constitutional review. In this regard, the fact that concurrency of legislative power is a feature of 25 of the world’s 29 federations, should not go unnoticed by the Constitutional Reforms Committee and Parliament.

V. Benefits of the Concurrent List

Concurrency of legislative power has several advantages in federal systems:

(i) It enables uniformity of laws throughout the country, which translates into simplicity, certainty and equality for citizens and foreign investors alike.

(ii) The federal government may wish to legislate nationwide standards (in education, healthcare, accountability, taxation, and corporate regulation for example) while leaving provincial governments to develop services in a manner sensitive to local circumstances and conditions.

(iii) It introduces an element of flexibility and innovation in the distribution of powers, allowing the federal government, for example, to postpone exercise of authority in a particular field until a matter becomes of federal importance. The provincial governments may, thus, in the interim, proceed with their own initiatives.

(iv) It enables the federal government to guide and encourage provincial efforts in areas either neglected or not catered to by a province.

(v) The device of concurrency also enables the federal government to temporarily occupy what are typically provincial fields of jurisdiction (a) to protect the national interest; (b) to deliver legislation or services falling under an item in the Concurrent List when a province is, for various reasons, unable to do so itself; (c) when a provincial government is incapable of or is failing to provide direly-needed legislation or services that would benefit the people of the province; (d) when a provincial government lacks the political will to pass direly-needed legislation or provide services that may otherwise be beneficial to their population; (e) when a provincial government lacks the resources or expertise to provide or implement certain policies; and (f) generally to fill a vacuum created by the legislative inaction of a provincial government.

(vi) It enables the federation to provide remedies for problems arising in the provincial sphere, but extending, or liable to extend beyond the boundaries of a single province.

(vii) It obviates the necessity of enumerating complicated, minute subdivisions of individual functions to be assigned exclusively to either tier of the legislature.

(viii) It makes it easier, simpler and cheaper for national systems to link up with global systems. Globalization, as a phenomenon, has created a great deal of mobility of goods, services, capital and technology, resulting in closer integration amongst nations. There is a need for greater, more efficient and sustained coordination in identification and formulation of responses among the nations to the common challenges faced by them. This process of cohesive and concurrent action needs to generate, firstly, within the national context before it can be achieved in the international context. The diversities and differences between the provinces have to be bridged and harmonized in order that these may link with global processes for viable sustained, development and growth. A major field of undertaking new initiatives in these spheres would lie in the legislative domain where concurrence and coherence between the provinces and their different needs have to be harmonized to evolve national policies and outlooks. This is particularly important for investment, business, trade, technology, financial services, etc. in both the national and global context.

VI. Consequences of Abolishing the Concurrent List

Abolishing the Concurrent List in Pakistan will create both foreseeable and unforeseeable consequences. Some of the foreseeable consequences, inter alia, are as follows:

(i) It would deprive the federation of legislative power in many areas in which nationwide legislation is not only desirable but can be more effective. Certain legislation, such as that governing administration of justice, civil and criminal procedure, regulation of companies and the financial services sector, competition, accountability, taxation, etc. require uniformity and nationwide application. If the national application of such legislation is abolished and each province is allowed to go its own way, national cohesion will be lost, the cost of doing business will go up, domestic and foreign investment will further be discouraged (as investors will have to deal with four different systems, instead of a single uniform system).

(ii) In the absence of federal legislation with nationwide applicability, there will be a plethora of different laws and regulations for the Pakistani people and foreign investors to deal with. There will be a breakdown in the system as critical subjects become fractured amongst the provinces. This will lead to further inefficiency and corruption. The number of laws and regulations would become quadrupled with each of the four provinces promulgating their own version of legislation on the same subject-matters.

(iii) It would weaken the federal Parliament (National Assembly and Senate) as important subjects currently within its purview would be transferred to the provincial assemblies. In this process, the Senate, which gives equal representation to the provinces at the federal level, would also be weakened resulting in the undesired weakening of institutionalized provincial power at the federal level.

(iv) It would dismantle large parts of the federal government that have in the past been, and are likely in the future to be, more effective than provincial governments in offering solutions and delivering services to the people of Pakistan and upholding national interests.

(v) It would substantially reduce the federation’s revenue as provincial legislative power transfers substantial revenue collection from the federation to the provinces. This would adversely impact the federation’s spending powers and, resultantly, its influence, thereby resulting in the weakening of the federation.

(vi) It would deprive provinces of the minimum standards set by the federal government in various spheres, which are, more often than not, due to the more diverse inputs behind them, higher than the standards set by provincial governments.

(vii) Laws would assume a patched provincial outlook rather than a seamless national outlook and further provincial interests rather than national interests, with social, political and economic consequences.

(viii) Domestic and foreign investors, businesses and professionals doing work in one province will not readily be able to expand their businesses to other provinces as the regulatory systems in each province would be different and unfamiliar. It will give rise to repetitive and redundant regulatory processes. This will increase the cost of doing business in Pakistan as a whole, especially for national businesses and foreign multinationals who wish to do business in all the provinces of Pakistan.

(ix) Competition between provinces on the same subject-matter would result in a phenomenon, which is known as the “race to the bottom.” Since the optimal outcome for a group of participants results from cooperation between the participants, it is put in danger by the fact that the optimal outcome for each individual is to not cooperate while the others do cooperate. An economic example of racing to the bottom in the context of federalism is tax competition between provincial governments. Each provincial government may benefit from higher tax revenues by having a high tax on corporate profits. However, provincial governments can benefit individually with a lower corporate tax rate relative to the other provincial governments in order to attract businesses away from the other provinces. This action would hurt all provincial governments except the one that undercut the others. In order to maintain the equilibrium, each of the other provincial governments would have to lower their corporate tax rates to match the "defector" (the provincial government that first lowered the tax rate). The end result would be that each provincial government would be compelled to adopt a lower corporate tax rate and, thus, collect less revenue overall. Whereas a uniform tax levied by the federal government and applicable nationwide (i.e. on all provinces) would prevent such an undesirable outcome from a revenue standpoint.

(x) Powerful elements and vested interests, which hold sway over provinces but are unable to exert influence on national legislation because their influence is diluted at the larger national level, will become more powerful within their provinces as their influence is concentrated at the provincial level enabling them to exert influence on provincial legislation on subject-matters that were hitherto being legislated at the national level. This is a phenomenon known as “interest group capture.”

(xi) The track record of the provinces in utilizing their own powers under the Concurrent List and their provincial budgets for the benefit of their subjects has been dismally poor and there is no indication that there would be any shift in their attitudes and approaches. Since they have not done justice to their people with their existing powers and existing budgets, they are unlikely to translate the enhanced powers and enhanced budgets, which they will inherit with the abolishment of the Concurrent List, for the benefit of their people.

(xii) Judges being elevated to the Supreme Court from the Provincial High Courts would have to educate themselves on the laws of three additional provinces, which would be different from the laws of the province from which they came.

(xiii) It would break one of the crucial threads of unity that binds the people of Pakistan’s four provinces with one another, i.e. common and familiar laws and regulatory systems. Different laws and regulatory systems in different provinces on the same subjects will create further division and distance between the Pakistani people, when the exact opposite is required. Familiarity will be replaced with unfamiliarity, comfort with alienation. Diversity is beneficial, indeed desirable, in culture, arts, language, literature, music, etc. but it becomes problematic in legislation and regulation where standardization, uniformity, simplicity and certainty are needed for development and progress.

VII. The More Viable Alternative

If one of the aims of constitutional reform is to strengthen provincial autonomy, the answer lies in (i) creating a third list, the Provincial List, and transferring some powers from the Concurrent List to the newly-created Provincial List and/or (ii) transferring some powers from the Federal List to the Concurrent List, not in abolishing the latter.

Furthermore, the principal critique of concurrency is not that it is not required, but that it is used without consultation: that it is not exercised effectively to deepen interdependence and cooperation between the Provinces and the Federation but to stress dominance of the Federal point of view. This has to change and can be changed whilst retaining the Concurrent List. What is required is the institutional validation of the exercise of concurrent powers with provincial consultation, input and feedback and to do away with the unilateral exercise of such powers by the Federation. This will restore the balance inherent in the original constitutional scheme and impart considerable vitality and credibility to Federal initiatives in the exercise of concurrent powers.

It has to be conceded that institutional arrangements for facilitating exchange of views between the Provinces and the Federation on matters falling within the field of concurrent legislation leave something to be desired. This has happened in spite of the existence of the Council of Common Interests (“CCI”) under Article 153 of the Constitution. The CCI has yet to develop into a mechanism to be relied on for an ongoing process of dialogue on vital socio-economic and political issues between the federation and the Provinces and amongst the Provinces themselves. Article 154 of the Constitution tasks the CCI with formulating and regulating policies in relation to matters in Part II of the Federal Legislative List and, insofar as they relate to the affairs of the Federation, other matters in the Concurrent List.

There is, however, no formal institutional structure that requires mandatory consultation between the Federation and the Provinces in the field of legislation under the Concurrent List, which covers several items of crucial importance to the national economy and national security. This has been despite the existence of numerous judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that have stressed the need for provincial participation in matters affecting the federation. As an example, in Gadoon Textile Mills v. WAPDA, the Supreme Court observed:

"CCI occupies an important and pivotal position in the structure of the Constitution and it cannot be ignored, bypassed, surpassed or obstructed in performance of its Constitutional duties and obligations. Any attempt to obtain decisions in respect of matters referable to CCI, by any other person, authority, Government or corporation will be in violation of the Constitution lacking legal sanctity."
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted the importance of the CCI as an integral part of the federal structure of Pakistan. In Wattan Party v. Federation of Pakistan , the Supreme Court declared that the procedural rules framed by the CCI were required to be strictly adhered to for the purpose of implementation and carrying out its policies. In another judgment, the Singh High Court reiterated that, under the Constitution, the CCI was conceived as an institution of great importance in the federal structure of the Constitution meant for safeguarding the interests of the federating units and securing the harmonious functioning of government both at the federal and provincial levels.

Therefore, insofar as the exercise of concurrent powers is concerned, the task of consulting each other prior to the exercise of powers under the Concurrent List should be made mandatory for both the Federation and the Provinces. In this regard, the CCI is the best forum for such consultation. Consultation, of course, should, in the spirit of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Al-Jehad Trust Case , be “effective, meaningful, purposive, consensus-oriented, leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play.”

Finally, to prevent extra-constitutional interventions and deviations, a mechanism similar to that of Article 44(2) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 should be adopted by allowing the Federal Parliament to intervene by passing legislation with regard to any matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a province when it is necessary to: (i) maintain national security; (ii) maintain national unity; (iii) maintain essential national standards; (iv) establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or (v) prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of another province or to the country as a whole.

VIII. Conclusion

The problems that have attracted attention in the field of Federal-Provincial relations have less to do with the existence, rationale or structure of the Concurrent List than with the manner and mechanism in which the Federation and Provinces have exercised their powers thereunder.

The Concurrent List has to be regarded as a valuable instrument for consolidating and furthering the principle of cooperative and creative federalism that has made a major contribution to nation-building, national unity and cohesion. What we require is to institutionalize, make meaningful and mandatory the process of consultation between the Federation and the Provinces on legislation under the Concurrent List by enhancing the role of the CCI thereby enhancing the sphere of subjects on which provincial consultation becomes mandatory.

The Concurrent List provides a fine balance between the need for uniformity and synergy in the national laws and a simultaneous jurisdiction for the Provinces to accommodate the diversities and peculiarities of different regions and adds a distinguishing feature in the federal scheme envisaged by the framers of the Constitution.

The Concurrent List vividly expresses and illustrates the underlying process of nation-building in the setting of our heterogeneity and diversity. The framers of the Pakistani Constitution, and indeed most of the world’s federal constitutions, recognized that there was a category of subjects of common interest which could not be allocated exclusively either to the Provinces or the Federation. Furthermore, a broad uniformity of approach in legislative policy was essential to combine specific requirements of different provinces with the articulation of a common national policy objective. In other words, the Constitution envisaged that the Federation and Provinces would be partners in development. In light of this, the Concurrent List could well be considered creative federalism at its best.

Greater provincial autonomy should not be given for reasons of political expediency. In the final analysis, it must benefit the people of these Provinces who are, foremost, equal citizens of Pakistan. Parliament has to assess the impact such autonomy would have on national unity, national interest and national cohesion. In many instances, the Federal Government, through legislation, has been the harbinger of social uplift and reform in the Provinces and has spearheaded and pushed social reform and economic development in Provinces. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the Provinces have been, somewhat, lethargic on many issues. Provincial legislation has been found wanting on many fronts. Also, in this day and age of globalization and standardization, when it is all the more imperative to have uniformity on many issues within the Federation, it is difficult to make out a case for greater provincial autonomy. It seems that we are donning the couture of provincial autonomy when it is no longer in vogue in the rest of the world. Europe, for example, is moving away from national autonomy towards interdependence and uniformity: EU legislation is increasingly overriding domestic legislation of sovereign member states.

The whole framework of legislative relations between the Federation and the Provinces, enshrined in Chapter 1 of Part V of the Constitution, has stood the test of time. The Concurrent List had the unanimous approval of Parliament behind it: it was adopted by Parliament when it unanimously passed the Constitution on 10 April 1973, which came into effect on 14 April 1973. A myth has been conjured up by some politicians that the Concurrent List was to be abolished in 10 years from the commencement date of the Constitution. This myth first reared its head sometime in the 1980s and was unheard of before. The fact remains that no such promise or provision is contained in the Constitution and, furthermore, the record of Parliamentary debates leading up to the passing of the Constitution shows that no such proposal was even discussed in Parliament. On the contrary, Parliament increased the powers of the Federation by enhancing the number of subjects in the Federal List from 49 to 67 and re-introduced the Concurrent List with 47 subjects, the highest number of subjects in the Concurrent List in Pakistan’s constitutional history. These were hardly the actions of a Parliament intent on abolishing the Concurrent List in 10 years time!

It may be pertinent to mention that where a constitutional provision was envisaged to be abandoned or abolished at some future point in time, such expiry provision was expressly mentioned in the Constitution. The only example of this is the Proviso to Article 27 of the Constitution pertaining to safeguards against discrimination in services, which states that the government may reserve seats or quotas for any class of persons to secure their adequate representation in the service of Pakistan for a period not exceeding 40 years, i.e. the quota system is scheduled to come to an end on 14 April 2013. Yet no such expiry provision was mentioned in the Constitution in relation to the Concurrent List. Furthermore, there is also no documentary evidence, not even a single newspaper clipping from that period, which proves that President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promised to abolish the Concurrent List in 10 years time, as falsely claimed by some. Even if it were so, which it isn’t, the President’s desire cannot override the unanimous will of Parliament. The proponents of this myth have not been able to produce a single shred of documentary evidence in support of their claim and are, therefore, doing a disservice to the constitutional history of Pakistan.

Above all, the abolishment of the Concurrent List will lead to the weakening of the Pakistani Federation. The move to abolish the Concurrent List at the altar of provincial autonomy – driven mostly by certain political forces that do not hold the interests of Pakistan at heart – is either very sinister or extremely reckless and will act as the Trojan Horse to Pakistan’s federal citadel. Abolishing the Concurrent List is tantamount to transforming Pakistan from a federation into a confederation or “loose federation”, which may result in Pakistan meeting a fate similar to that of two other “loose federations” - the erstwhile USSR and Yugoslavia. It is the national duty of every patriotic Pakistani Parliamentarian, indeed the entire Pakistani nation, to save this crucial feature of the Federation. The desire for greater provincial autonomy notwithstanding, strengthening of the Provinces should not come at the cost of the weakening of the Federation.

This paper was distributed to all Parliamentarians of Pakistan on 23 March 2010 and was published in its entirety as a full-page feature under the title "Concurrent Legislative List" in 'Business Recorder' newspaper on 18 April 2010

18 June 2008

We made history, but didn't change it

Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam

On 13 and 14 June 2008, Pakistan’s lawyers, having already set the record for running the longest and largest movement of lawyers in world history, again made history by holding the most successful and diverse “Long March” in Pakistani history culminating in the largest rally in the history of the capital Islamabad and one of the biggest rallies in the history of Pakistan. At the call of the Bar Associations, close to 500,000 Pakistanis (among them approximately 50,000 lawyers) gathered on the parade ground at the juncture of Jinnah Avenue and Constitution Avenue to demand the immediate restoration of the Pakistani judiciary and the impeachment and trial of President Musharraf under Article 6 of the Constitution.

However, there is widespread disappointment and despondency both within the legal community and amongst the general public at the manner in which the Long March ended without a sit-in or dharna. The Bar leadership’s decision not to go for a sit-in is being severely criticized in the lawyers community. It is being perceived as a great let-down of the hopes and aspirations of the people, particularly lawyers. It is being seen as an anti-climax to a much hyped-up Long March – a much ado about nothing.

To err is human. While we trust them and hope to continue to trust them, this does not mean that the Bar leadership – comprising, among others, Aitzaz Ahsan, Munir A. Malik, Justice (Retd.) Tariq Mahmood, Hamid Khan, Ali Ahmed Kurd and Athar Minallah – are infallible and cannot fall prey to errors of judgment. Although, it is difficult to believe that the fire-brand Ali Ahmed Kurd would not be in favour of a dharna or sit-in. Could this explain his conspicuous absence from the rally despite assurances from the Bar leadership that his absence was due to ill health?

The question, which requires an explanation from the Bar leadership, is why did they not call for a sit-in or dharna?

Aitzaz Ahsan, during and after the rally, has provided the following reasons to explain why there was no sit-in: (i) no sit-in was announced by the Bar leadership in the first instance, (ii) no planning and logistics was done for the sit-in, i.e. no shade, food, water and toilet facilities; (iii) the Bar had no finances to successfully execute a sit-in and (iv) only a few people would have carried out the sit-in which would have diminished the impact and achievement of the Long March.

Aitzaz Ahsan’s explanation raises more questions than it answers.

(i) It is correct that no sit-in had been formally announced by the Bar leadership, yet neither did the Bar leadership ever make it clear that there would be no sit-in. There is not a single news item in the press in which anyone from amongst the Bar leadership is on record saying that there would be no sit-in. The announcement to this effect only came from Aitzaz Ahsan at 6:00 a.m. on 14 June, which ended the Long March with a whimper rather than a bang. Never did the Bar leadership formally decline a sit-in and, in the charged atmosphere of the Long March, this omission created a perception amongst its participants that was justified. The Bar leadership, being the learned men of law that they are, should have known better that, in the circumstances, silence would be construed as consent. It is difficult to fathom why the voices of “dharna” did not reach the ears of the Bar leadership in the preparatory stages leading up to the Long March, during the Long March and during the rally in Islamabad. For anyone who was in Lahore during the departure of the Long March convoy to Islamabad on the evening of 12 June, the sound “dharna” was in the air and most participants were proceeding on the assumption of a sit-in in Islamabad. Indeed, they were looking forward to a sit-in. In such circumstance, having heard these voices, why did the Bar leadership chose to remain silent on the issue and not come up with a clarification? Failure to do so created an assumption in favour of there being a sit-in and raised the expectations of many participants.

(ii) It is illogical to assume that if someone is going to travel by road from Karachi and Quetta all the way to Islamabad in a Long March for something as important as the restoration of the judiciary that they would be undertaking such a difficult, tiring, expensive and arduous journey just to sit on the parade ground in Islamabad and hear speeches, songs and poetry, which they have heard a thousand times before and that too at odd hours of the night when the rest of Pakistan slept. Granted that we are willing to stay awake until dawn for such a cause but we have already passed such nocturnal tests in past rallies and for a change we’d like a daylight rally when the rest of the nation is awake and takes better notice.

(iii) Aitzaz Ahsan’s explanation of there being no finances for a sit-in also doesn’t sound convincing. Finances for what? 500,000 Pakistanis are already “sitting-in” in front of Parliament and Aiwan-e-Sadr, what further finances do you need to extend the sit-in even for just a day? Most participants were expecting to stay on till Saturday night. They had already factored in the sit-in for duration of Saturday into their budgets and schedules. None of the participants complained of running out of finances. Why did Aitzaz Ahsan even raise this issue?

(iv) Aitzaz Ahsan’s claim that the sit-in would be a failure because only a few people would have carried out the sit-in which would have diminished the impact and achievement of the rally and the Long March is also based on false assumptions, which have no empirical basis. Had a survey been conducted of the participants to ascertain their wishes? None whatsoever. While taking note of a 100 or so excited, noisy and aggressive participants at the front of the rally, Aitzaz Ahsan assumed that the rest of the participants who were less noisy and less aggressive would not be in favour of a sit-in and only those 100 or so were in favour. Again, a totally false assumption because majority of the participants were indeed in favour of a sit-in and would have participated in the sit-in had the Bar leadership called for it. Most people do not desire to go against the leadership and they obey the leadership. Hence, no one proceeded with the sit-in after it was announced that there would not be any. This does not mean that they did not desire the leadership to call for a sit in. In fact, Aitzaz deliberately did not announce the decision of the sit-in until the dying seconds of his speech at the end of the rally. It is clear that he was expecting a negative reaction from the participants had he announced his decision in the beginning of his speech rather than at the end. When the decision was announced, the reaction of the participants could be seen from their body language and on their dumbfounded, flabbergasted and shell-shocked faces. This can be gauged by the fact that there was no applause after the final curtain fell on the Long March.

In giving his justifications not to proceed with the sit-in, Aitzaz Ahsan assumed too much. He assumed that if such a course was taken it would result in failure for such and such reasons. For a lawyer, assumptions can be fatal. Lawyers are not trained to assume the worst-case scenario; otherwise they would never take on any case. Failure is always an option when fighting any battle, even a legal battle, but the Bar leadership, according to Aitzaz Ahsan, assumed that the sit-in would be a failure thereby breaking a cardinal rule of being a lawyer: when deciding upon a course of action, never assume the worst and never make decisions or alter your course out of fear of failure. You have to take calculated risks and the risk of a sit-in was worth taking because you have amassed 500,000 people at your call in one place and you are unlikely to repeat such a feat again.

Aitzaz Ahsan says the impact of this Long March will be felt in times to come. The people of Pakistan are tired and weary of waiting for events to make their impact at some future date, which usually never happens. History is full of events that have immediate impact and this rally may have been one of them had a sit-in been announced. The people of Bangladesh and Ukraine have demonstrated this in recent times. The overnight presence of 500,000 people on an important capital road would have a different impact if the capital was in a country where there is democracy, accountability, the rule of law and a mature, responsive and answerable political set-up. It doesn’t have the desired impact in countries like Pakistan where you have deaf and blind leaders bereft of integrity, common sense and reason, who hold on to power till the bitter end at the cost of national interests, and where a more aggressive yet peaceful posture such as a dharna (in the least) is required to get the message across.

A sit-in did not mean crossing barbed wire, confronting riot police or entering the so-called ‘red zone’ that cordoned off the Constitution Avenue from the rally. The Bar leadership could have simply asked the participants of the rally to continue sitting on the parade ground for a few more hours until the National Assembly convened at 10:00 a.m. and until the session ended. It was a question of waiting for a few more hours till dusk on Saturday. It would have created a bigger impact for incoming and departing Parliamentarians to see, with their own eyes, that huge mass of their fellow countrymen and the impact it would have had for the rest of the people of Pakistan to wake up to see on TV that mass of people still sitting there overnight for the country while they slept. It was a question of turning it up just one notch further and it didn’t require the logistics, the money, the alliances and the risk that Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan so wrongly assumed it would and nor the weather: it was a cloudy Saturday morning in Islamabad with no sun beating down on us, and even if it did, it would have been worth the while and the most glorious tan we could ever get.

History is a series of events. Whether such events are remembered by posterity and are forever etched in history depends much on the impact and the directional-shift that they create on the course of a nation’s history. Moments like this come but rarely and when they do come, it is up to a nation to seize them or let them pass on into oblivion. On the night of 13/14 June 2008, we, the People of Pakistan, made history, but didn’t change it.

2 April 2007

Acting CJP and the Supreme Judicial Council

Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam

Ever since the President sent a Reference to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) against the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP), Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, under Article 209 of the Constitution of Pakistan on that fateful day of March 9, 2007, there has been a lot of comment on the issue in the media. However, there seem to be a lot of misconceptions in the minds of some commentators who have commented on many of the legal and constitutional issues involved, particularly relating to the role and powers of the SJC and to the constitutionality of appointing an Acting CJP. This article is an attempt to clarify and remove some of these misconceptions.

At the outset, it may be pertinent to mention that, although it is made up of the CJP, two senior-most Supreme Court judges and two senior-most High Court chief justices, the SJC is neither a court nor a tribunal, judicial or otherwise. The SJC is neither conducting nor is it empowered to conduct a trial. The SJC is a board of inquiry with the specific and exclusive authority to inquire into allegations of incapacity or misconduct of judges of the superior judiciary (i.e. the Supreme Court and the High Courts). The difference between a court/tribunal and a board of inquiry is that whereas a court/tribunal can pass a judgment and execute that judgment itself, a board of inquiry can only make a finding and, on the basis of such finding, make a non-binding recommendation to a separate executing authority for further action. It remains the executing authority's discretion to decide on whether or not to take action on the basis of that recommendation. In the case of the SJC, the executing authority is the President of Pakistan. A further distinction between the two is that a court has the power to punish for contempt, whereas a board of inquiry does not. The rationale is simple: since a board of inquiry does not pass binding or executable orders, there can be no violation of such orders, and hence, no contempt. This view is reinforced by the fact that the SJC is not included in the definition of a “court” in Article 204 of the Constitution, which confers upon the Supreme Court and the High Courts the power to punish for contempt. Also, since the SJC is not a court, the inquiries that it conducts do not fall under the category of sub judice matters.

Article 180 of the Constitution prescribes the circumstances in which an Acting CJP may be appointed. Under Article 180, only the senior-most Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan can be appointed the Acting CJP if (a) “the office of Chief Justice of Pakistan is vacant; or (b) the Chief Justice of Pakistan is absent or is unable to perform the functions of his office due to any other cause.” There is no provision in Article 180 for the appointment of an Acting Chief Justice of Pakistan in the event that a reference is filed against the CJP.

One of the cardinal principles of natural justice is enshrined in the legal maxim “nemo debet esse judex in propria causa” (“no man shall be a judge in his own cause”). If a reference were to be sent to the SJC against the CJP, it is obvious that, under this legal principle, the CJP, as a member and ex officio Chairman of the SJC, should not sit in judgment of himself. The CJP would have three options: (i) to resign; (ii) to voluntarily go on leave and make himself “absent” within the definition of Article 180(b); or (iii) to refuse to go on leave. If the CJP resigns, the reference is rendered infructious and the matter comes to an immediate end. If the CJP voluntarily goes on leave and makes himself absent, then an Acting CJP may be appointed under Article 180(b) for a limited period of time (in this period of time, as it will be demonstrated later, an Acting CJP cannot preside over the SJC). However, if the CJP were to refuse to go on voluntary leave and make himself “absent”, then a constitutional crisis would ensue for there is no provision in the Constitution that empowers either the President or the SJC, before the completion of an inquiry under Article 209, to either dismiss, suspend, or send the CJP on forced leave or to declare him “non-functional.” If this were the case, then provision would have been made in Article 180 to cater for such an eventuality. Article 180 is exhaustive and provides for all the eventualities in which an Acting CJP can be appointed.

At this juncture, it may be pertinent to mention that, in the current judicial and constitutional crisis, the Federal Law Minister, Mr. Wasi Zafar, has stated that the CJP has been sent on forced leave under Section 2 of the Judges (Compulsory Leave) Order, 1970 as validated by the Validation of Laws Act, 1975 (the “1970 Order”). The 1970 Order is in direct and flagrant violation of Article 209 of the Constitution, which states that “A Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court shall not be removed from office except as provided by this Article.” All mechanisms for the removal of a judge of the superior courts are exclusively provided for by the Constitution and Parliament does not have power, except through a constitutional amendment, to provide for any extra-constitutional mechanism for the removal, temporary or permanent, of judges belonging to the superior judiciary. Any law that is in contravention of the Constitution is void ab initio, i.e. it is dead on arrival. Therefore, sending the CJP on forced leave under the 1970 Order is blatantly unconstitutional on the touchstone of Article 209.

If the Constitution had envisaged that a reference could be filed against the CJP under Article 209 and bearing in mind the legal maxim that “no man can be a judge in his own cause”, the Constitution would have provided a mechanism that would have allowed either the President or the SJC to “suspend” the CJP or to send him on forced leave or render him “non-functional.” The Constitution would have also provided for a corresponding ground for the appointment of an Acting CJP under Article 180 in the event that the CJP becomes the subject of a reference under Article 209. Such a ground may have been enshrined in a third clause of Article 180 and may have read as follows: “(c) the Chief Justice of Pakistan is the subject of a reference under Article 209.”

Yet no such provision has been made in Article 180. None of the existing grounds provided in Article 180 can even widely be interpreted to include a reference under Article 209. A reference against the CJP under Article 209 does not render the office of the CJP “vacant” under Article 180(a) nor does it make him “absent” under Article 180(b). Nor does it render the CJP “unable to perform the functions of his office due to any other cause.” The latter pertains to mental or physical incapacity, i.e. a disability in the person of the CJP, and not his legal incapacity. Under no circumstances can such a ground be interpreted to include a reference under Article 209 against the CJP. Let us assume, hypothetically, that an acting CJP has the authority to preside over the SJC (which, according to the Supreme Court, he does not). Had this been the case, there would have been a corresponding provision in Article 209 that would have provided for the appointment of an acting CJP in the event that a reference was to be brought against the CJP, who is the ex officio Chairman of the SJC. An important point to note here is that, in such an eventuality, the Chairman of the SJC would not be the ex officio Acting CJP. The Acting CJP would be the ex officio Chairman of the SJC. In other words, even in such a case, the enabling provision for the appointment of an Acting CJP is Article 180, not Article 209. So the absence of an express provision in Article 180 for the appointment of an Acting CJP in the event that the CJP is the subject of a reference under Article 209 is further evidence that the Constitution did not intend for Article 209 to be invoked against the CJP.

Now coming to the question, raised earlier, on whether or not an Acting CJP has the authority to preside over the SJC, the Full Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in its historic landmark judgment delivered in the case of Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324), popularly known as the “Judges’ Case”, held the following:

“We are of the view that Acting Chief Justices are appointed for a short time and for that reason, in the relevant Articles, automatic arrangement is provided particularly in the appointment of the Acting Chief of Pakistan, but no criterion is laid down in the provision of appointment of Acting Chief Justice of the High Courts. In all fairness, the period for such acting appointment should not be more than ninety days during which Acting Chief Justice may perform functions of routine nature excluding “recommendations” in respect of appointment of Judges. We say so for three reasons. Firstly, Article 180, which provides for appointment of the Acting Chief Justice of Pakistan and Article 196, which provides for appointment of the Acting Chief Justice of a High Court, do not specifically provide that they can participate in the consultative scheme of the appointment of Judges as envisaged in the Constitution. Secondly, Acting Chief Justices are supposed to be functioning for a short time and, therefore, it would not be fair to allow them to interfere with policy-making matters and appointments in the Judiciary which should be left for permanent incumbents. Thirdly, Article 209 of the Constitution contemplates the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council which is supposed to be comprised of (a) the Chief Justice of Pakistan, (b) two next senior most Judges of the Supreme Court, and (c) two most senior Chief Justices of the High Courts. In the explanation appointment of Acting Chief Justices is expressly excluded which clearly shows that the intention of the Constitution-makers is that the Acting Chief Justices are allowed to function for a short time and more importance is to be attached to permanent Chief Justices and in the absence of permanent Chief Justices of the High Courts or, even for that matter, of the Supreme Court, the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council becomes imperfect and the Body as such becomes unfunctional.”
The above judgment of the full bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which is binding on the SJC, lays down the rule that an Acting CJP cannot preside over the SJC and without the participation of the permanent CJP, the SJC is “imperfect” and, therefore, coram non judice. It also lends credence to the argument that the CJP cannot be the subject-matter of a reference under Article 209.

This article was published in 'The Nation' newspaper on 1 April 2007